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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920316-CA
Priority No. 2

LOUIS LEE MACIAL,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in the Addendum:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
U.S.
Utah
Utah

Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(b)(ii)
Code Ann. § 76-3-201
Code Ann. § 76-3-401
Code Ann. § 77-17-10
R. Evid. 609
Const, amend. XIV
Const, art. I, § 10
Const, art. I, § 12

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the lone black female, a prospective juror who had
been involved in a discrimination lawsuit, was improperly excluded by
the prosecutor on the basis that she was "whiny."
To the extent that a trial court's ruling on the
proffered explanation of a prosecutor turns on the
latter's credibility, we agree with the United States
Supreme Court that "a reviewing court ordinarily
should give those findings great deference." (Batson
v. Kentucky, [476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986)]) Our
decisions demonstrate, however, "ordinarily" does not
mean "inevitably": in some cases the reviewing court
may conclude that the explanation is inherently
implausible in light of the whole record. And even
when there is no doubt of the prosecutor's good faith,
the issue whether a given explanation constitutes a
constitutionally permissible—i.e. nondiscriminatory—
justification for the particular peremptory challenge
remains a question of law.
People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 107 n.6 (Cal. 1986); Chew v. State,
562 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Md. App. 1989) ("an appellate court will give
great deference to the first level findings of fact made by a trial
judge, but having done so, will make an independent constitutional
appraisal concerning the existence of neutral, non-racial reasons
for the striking of a juror"); accord State v. Cantuf 778 P.2d 517
(Utah 1989); see also 778 P.2d at 519 (Hall, C.J., dissenting)
(opinion disagreeing with the majority's unwillingness to defer to
the trial court's findings and conclusion of law); cf. State v.
Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987) ("'Rubber stamp'
approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or
fanciful, would cripple Batson's commitment to 'ensure that no

- 2

-

citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race /n );
Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ga. 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for three
counts of "Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, Consenting, or
Arranging to Distribute a Controlled" Substance, all second degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii),
-(8)(1)(b)(i) (1991), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy, presiding.

(R 107-09).

On February 26, 1992, a jury found

Defendant/Appellant Louis Lee Macial guilty of the above entitled
offenses.

(R 107-09).

For each conviction, the trial court sentenced Mr. Macial
to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.

(R 116-18) (May 4, 1992 sentencing order).

The court

ordered the three sentences to run concurrently with one another.
Mr. Macial was also ordered to pay $180 in restitution for his
conviction on count I.

(R 116).

The court then stayed the

sentences, releasing Mr. Macial to Adult Probation and Parole for
thirty-six months. The restitution order remained one of the
conditions of probation.

(R 119).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Of the nineteen people questioned during the jury selection
process, three were excused for cause, four were peremptorily
challenged by the State and four were peremptorily challenged by

- 3 -

Mr. Macial.

(R 43). The remaining eight person jury, none of whom

were apparently persons of color, convicted Louis Macial, a Hispanic
male, of the three counts alleged in the information.

(R 6-7, 43,

134-204).
The prosecutor peremptorily challenged Bettye English, the
only black person in the jury selection pool, because "I [the
prosecutor] found her, for lack of a better term, to be somewhat
whiny.
jurors.

I don't think she would be a good juror with the other
And that was the sole basis.

race or anything else."

(R 216).

It had nothing to do with her

The prosecutor did not believe

that a lawsuit involving Ms. English, which alleged that she "was
terminated from [her] job through discrimination[,]" was "something
that was so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of
before the group."

(R 203, 216). Previously, when the court had

asked the jurors of their prior involvement in lawsuits, Ms. English
approached the bench and used a note to explain her situation.

The

court accepted the prosecutor's explanation as a race-neutral
reason.

(R 216).
The court also determined that "Juror No. 11," a person1

referred to by number rather than name out of concern for his
privacy, could not sit as a juror.

1

In a note shown privately to the

The trial court issued an order, for the purposes of
appeal, which requested that the record refer to the juror by number
rather than by name in an effort to protect the juror from the
embarrassment or humiliation accompanying the public disclosure of
his prior felony conviction. (R 196-97). Perhaps the same courtesy
should be extended to Ms. English in light of her feelings of
"embarrassment."
- 4

court, juror #11 revealed, "I have been convicted of sale of a
controled [sic] sub.

Exgpounged [sic] 1978."

(R 179).

Following the trial court's reading of the jury selection
statutes, it concluded that a prior felony conviction disqualified
juror #11 from jury duty notwithstanding the fact that the crime had
been expunged.

(R 193, 196). The court further ruled that he would

be biased and could be challenged for cause.

(R 194).

Other facts relevant to the jury selection process are
contained elsewhere in this brief.

See infra Argument.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State peremptorily challenged Bettye English, the only
black juror, on the basis that her involvement in a discrimination
lawsuit was not "something that was so personal that it would be
embarrassing to speak of before the group."

When the court had

asked the jurors of their prior legal involvement, Ms. English
approached the bench and used a note to explain her situation,
rather than through an oral response.
By comparison, however, when another juror privately
disclosed his involvement in a prior legal matter with a note, the
court and the prosecutor recognized his need for privacy.

This

other juror, a convicted felon with an expunged crime, was later
designated "Juror No.11" out of concern for the public humiliation
accompanying a reference to him by name through the court record.
The irony of the disparate treatment cannot be ignored: the
conviction of a juror, which is often exploited publicly by the
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prosecution, was deemed to be a legitimate personal matter, but the
lawsuit of another juror, which involved allegations of
discriminatory termination, was discounted by the State because it
did not seem "so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of
before the group."

Juror No.ll's privacy concerns regarding his

expunged felony conviction were not cited as a reason for his
exclusion, while at the same time, Ms. English's privacy concerns
became a factor relevant to the State's use of its peremptory
challenge.

Privacy concerns should have either been viewed alike or

ignored altogether.
A facially neutral rebuttal disclaimer constitutes an
inadequate legal explanation.

Since indirect discriminatory

peremptory challenges are just as improper as blatant racist
removals, a prosecutor's explanation must be neutral, related to the
case being tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate.
The prosecutor's contention, that the sole black juror was "whiny"
and would not "be a good juror with the other jurors" was vague and
speculative.

The State's explanation reflected no bias held by

Ms. English and it was especially unacceptable in light of the
apparently "pro-prosecution" circumstances in her background.
Further, even if "whiny" properly characterized her, it was
unrelated to the case and would have had no bearing on the guilt or
innocence determination.
When a juror is improperly excluded, the harmless error
analysis is inapplicable.

Since courts do not invade the province

of the jury, a new trial is required.

- 6 -

ARGUMENT
POINT
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY USED ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
AGAINST A FEMALE, BLACK JUROR
In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.

, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 111 S.Ct.

1364 (1991), the United Supreme Court reiterated the message of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the seminal opinion
regarding the use of peremptory challenges:
Batson "was designed 'to serve multiple ends,'" only
one of which was to protect individual defendants from
discrimination in the selection of jurors. Batson
recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and
the community at large.
Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 422 (citations omitted); Batson, 476 U.S.
at 85 n.4 & 99 n.22 ("The standard we adopt under the Federal
Constitution [U.S. Const, amend. XIV] is designed to ensure that a
State does not use peremptory challenges to strike any black juror
because of his race"); accord United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567,
1571 (11th Cir. 1986) ("under Batson, the striking of one black
juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even
where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for
the striking of some black jurors are shown"); State v. Butler/ 731
S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. App. 1987); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 364
(Ala. Cr. App. 1987).
Utah's state supreme court has similarly recognized that
the State's exclusion of even a single juror because of the
individual's race is offensive.

State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 340
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(Utah 1991) ("The discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minority
juror simply because a prosecutor believes that the juror's race may
influence the juror's decision in the case is offensive regardless
of the defendant's race"); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah
1988) ("Cantu I") ("The defendant may rely on the fact that the use
of peremptory challenges permits those who are of mind to
discriminate to do so").
Given the sensitive nature of the involved issues, courts
have also noted that "an attorney, although not intentionally
discriminating, may try to find reasons other than race to challenge
a black juror, when race may be his primary factor in deciding to
strike the juror."
App. 1987).

Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala. Cr.

Nevertheless, "the trial judge must be careful not to

confuse a specific reason given by the state's attorney for his
challenge, with a 'specific bias' of the juror, which may justify
the peremptory challenge."

Id. (emphasis added).

As discussed below, the trial court in the case at bar
erred when it mistakenly accepted the prosecutor's specified
reason—that the female black juror was "whiny"—even though Ms.
Bettye English's alleged whininess reflected no bias whatsoever as
it pertained to the facts of the case.

The prosecutor also failed

to provide a clear and distinct, legitimately, related basis.
A.

THE APPLICABLE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), the
opinion set forth five considerations relevant to a peremptory
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challenge analysis: (1) standing; (2) a proper objection; (3) a
prima facie showing of improper discrimination; (4) the rebuttal
explanation; and (5) the prejudicial effect.

Id. at 774.

However, as predicted by the opinion, the Powers decision
rejected "racial identity with excluded jurors as a standing
requirement for such objections."

805 P.2d at 775 (citing Powers,

113 L.Ed.2d 411); Span, 819 P.2d at 340 ("no standing requirement
exists which requires the defendant to be of the same race as the
challenged juror").
The second and third considerations similarly require no
analysis because:
once a party accused of improper discrimination
attempts to rebut that accusation with evidence that
the challenged action was proper, the question of
whether a prima facie case was made in the first place
"is no longer relevant." Instead, the focus shifts to
the ultimate issue of whether improper discrimination
has occurred.
Harrison, 805 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted); accord Williams v.
State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988) ("We follow the rule
that, when the prosecution's explanations for its strikes are of
record, we will review the trial court's findings of discrimination
vel non, even though there has been no express finding by the trial
court that a prima facie case has been established"); Gamble v.
State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ga. 1987).
In regards to the fourth consideration, the adequacy of the
rebuttal, "[r]elying on Batson, it has been found that an
explanation given by a prosecutor for the exercise of a peremptory
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challenge must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried,
(3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'"

State v.

Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") (citing State v.
Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987)); Gamble, 357 S.E.2d
at 795.2

The prosecutor's explanation in the present case did not

meet the necessary requirements.
When the court had asked the jurors about their prior
involvement in lawsuits, Ms. English requested to approach the bench
and then responded to the court's inquiry with a note: "I, Bettye
English, was attempting to sue the Board of Education because I was
terminated from my job through discrimination because I did not have
EEO involved — "

(R 203).

After the State had been apprised of the

note's contents, the prosecutor reacted: "I felt, based on her
unwillingness to speak before the rest of the group about a matter

2

Other comparable factors cast doubt upon the legitimacy
of a purportedly race-neutral explanation:
We agree that the presence of one or more of these
factors will tend to show that the state's reasons are
not actually supported by the record or are an
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not
shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2)
failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor
opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3)
singling the juror out for special questioning
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the
case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally
applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged.
Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18,
22 (Fla. 1988)); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 362 (Ala. App. 1987).
- 10 -

that I didn't find —

I'm sure she felt that it was personal,

naturally, but her note indicated she had a lawsuit against the
school district.

I didn't see it to be something that was so

personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of before the group.11
(R 216).
B.

THE PROSECUTOR'S EXPLANATION WAS NOT RACE
NEUTRAL BECAUSE SIMILARLY SITUATED JURORS
WERE TREATED DIFFERENTLY

The prosecutor's explanation must remain consistent with
the treatment extended similarly situated jurors.

See State v.

Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. App. 1987) (conflicting reasons do
not suffice because "[t]he prosecutor cannot have in both ways");
People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 109 (Cal. 1986); cf. Floyd v. State,
539 So.2d 357, 362-63 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987) (disparate treatment of
the prospective jurors is improper).
In the case at bar, two jurors disclosed their involvement
in a legal matter with a written note rather than through an oral
response.

Bettye English, the lone black juror, revealed her

involvement in a discrimination lawsuit with a note.

(R 203).

Immediately after Ms. English had submitted her note, "Juror No. 11"
approached the bench and conveyed a message of his own.

(R 162). 3

Although juror #11 was subsequently excused, neither the court nor

3

See supra note 1. A distinction should also be noted
that, in contrast to viewing juror #ll,s written note as a personal
matter which should have been revealed to the public, both the
prosecutor and the court instead focused on whether juror #11's
expunged felony conviction disqualified him as a juror. (R 179-99).
- 11 -

the prosecutor viewed juror #11's written message as an improper
attempt to protect his privacy.
Juror #11 is the convicted felon, an individual whose past
history is typically emphasized by the prosecution and exposed in
court for purposes of trial (e.g. impeachment) and sentencing
(e.g. arrest record).

See, e.g., Utah R. Evid. 609; Utah Code Ann.

§§ 76-3-201, -401. Notwithstanding the prosecution's contention
that he "didn't [view Ms. English's lawsuit as] "something that was
so personal that it would be embarrassing to speak of before the
group[,]" (R 216), juror #ll,s expunged felony conviction was, by
comparison, atypically viewed as a personal and potentially
embarrassing past legal matter worthy of protection.

See (R 179-80;

185; 194-97).
Ms. English and juror #11 were treated differently, even
though they had both revealed a personal legal matter with a note.
The references to Ms. English's sensitivity and her reluctance to
speak in public contrasts with the compassion extended juror #11, a
convict whose past often becomes the subject of an "on-the-record"
inquiry and humiliation.

The jurors' past legal involvement—

regardless of whether it pertained to a felony offense or a
discrimination case—should have been viewed alike, and not as a
potentially embarrassing situation for one juror and as a
circumstance unrelated to the exclusion of another.

Unlike the

court's ability to seal and protect a convicted juror from the
public disclosure of his crime, the improperly accepted peremptory
challenge subjected Ms. English to open humiliation beyond that
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already experienced in her discrimination lawsuit.
McCollum, 505 U.S.

Georgia v.

, 120 L.Ed.2d 33, 44, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992)

("Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, . . . the
juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination");
Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 427 ("A venireperson excluded from jury
service because of race suffers a profound personal humiliation
heightened by its public character11); see supra note 1.
C.

THE PROSECUTOR'S EXPLANATION LACKED CLARITY,
SPECIFICITY, AND LEGITIMACY

The prosecutor also deemed Ms. English, "for lack of a
better term, to be somewhat whiny.

I don't think she would be a

good juror with the other jurors. And that was the sole basis.
had nothing to do with her race or anything else."

(R 216).

The

court sided with the prosecutor:
THE COURT: All right. You have made the record. I
mean — well, what [the prosecutor] has said to me, to
my mind, justifies, for reasons other than race, his
peremptory challenge. What he has said here
corresponded with my observations of Ms. English's
demeanor, and that's why I ruled that the reasons
stated by [the prosecutor] are not made up, they are
not pretentious but, in fact, made sense to me. That
is the reason he did what he did rather than doing it
for reasons of race.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Perhaps I ought to respond to
that, because my perception of her demeanor was
nothing like that. Of course, we all have different
perspectives.
(R 216-17).

- 13 -

It

1.

The prosecutor failed to cite a specific
"bias" of the juror

"[T]he trial judge must be careful not to confuse a
specific reason given by the state's attorney for his challenge,
with a 'specific bias/ of the juror, which may justify the
peremptory challenge."

Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357, 361 (Ala. Cr.

App. 1987) (emphasis added); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah
1989) (construing People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 857 (1983)
("peremptories must be based on grounds reasonably related to case
on trial or for reasons of specific bias")); see also People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
at bar was misplaced.

The trial court,s focus in the case

No bias was suggested in the prosecutor's

response.
Other than the generalized questions addressed to the jury
pool as a whole, the State asked no questions of Ms. English which
could have tested her impartiality.

Cf. People v. Turner, 726 P.2d

102, 111 (Cal. 1986) (citation omitted) ("A prosecutor's failure to
engage Black prospective jurors 'in more than desultory voir dire,
or indeed to ask them any questions at all,' before striking them
peremptorily, is one factor supporting an inference that the
challenge is in fact based on group bias"); Cantu II, 778 P.2d
at 518 (quoting Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22 ("factors that may cast
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation
[include the] . . . failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel
had questioned the juror, . . .")); Butler, 731 S.W.2d at 269
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("Without some form of inquiry, a prosecutor could easily conceal
his true reason for removing black jurors by simply inventing
'neutral' reasons for the strikes11); Floyd, 539 So.2d at 362.
Absent the detection of bias and because of the lack of questioning,
the State provided no legitimate reason for Ms. English's exclusion.
2.

The prosecutor failed to state a clear and
reasonably specific explanation

The State's assertion of Ms. English being "whiny" is so
broad and nebulous that it failed to satisfy the "clear and
reasonably specific" requirement for race-neutral explanations.

See

Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518; Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 504
(Ala. Cr. App. 1988); £f. People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 110 (Cal
1986) ("the assertion that 'something in her work' would 'not be
good for the People's case' is so lacking in content as to amount to
virtually no explanation"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 507 ("The
prosecutor's reasoning that she was 'docile' during voir dire
questioning and was 'lacking the strength of conviction it would
take to sit in judgment in a case of this magnitude' is also
doubtful"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A
prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily
to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or
'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind
if a white juror had acted identically").

Moreover, the

prosecutor's allegation was expressly rejected by defense counsel
who stated, "my perception of her demeanor was nothing like that."
(R 216-17).
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Indeed, since Bettye English possessed a background
apparently favorable to the prosecution, the State's decision to
exclude the black juror merely because of her alleged "whininess"
casts further doubt upon the legitimacy of the explanation.
Ms. English has a daughter who works for the FBI and a son who "had
an electric car stolen from the house, and someone broke into his
truck and took a jack and CB and stuff like that."

(R 164, 168).

The State should not have been allowed to exclude her.

Cf. Turner,

726 P.2d at 106 (citation omitted) ("On voir dire neither had
expressed any views indicating partiality to the defense; on the
contrary, both prospective jurors 'had backgrounds which suggested
that, had they been white, the prosecution would not have
peremptorily excused them ,n ); see also (R 140-53) (Ms. English, [who
was a wife, a mother, and a grandparent], possessed characteristics
common to other jurors who were not excluded).
In addition, the prosecutor's claim that Ms. English "would
[not] be a good juror with the other jurors" finds no support in the
record and is a more nebulous "conclusory nuance" than the "whiny"
characterization.

See People v. Washington, 234 Cal.Rptr. 204 (Cal.

App. 4 Dist. 1987) (reversal required because the prosecutor's
contentions that the juror—who "spoke softly," "would not be able
to speak up [or to stand up] to the other jurors," and "didn't
appear to be a decision maker"—was "neither supported by the record
nor the law"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 506-07 ("The speculation that
her [the prospective juror] having heard of appellant might
prejudice her against the prosecution is just that—speculation
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. . . [and her] connection, possibly negative, with 'law
enforcement,' . . . also appears to be nothing more than speculation
and is unsupported by voir dire examination"); Butler, 731 S.W.2d
at 272 (prosecutor cannot speculate that because nurses are
generally compassionate, the involved nurse would also be "inclined
to feel sorry for defendants").

The State's rebuttal explanation

failed to set forth a legitimate, race-neutral explanation.
D.

THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO STATE A REASON
RELATED TO THE CASE BEING TRIED

"Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendants case merely
by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his]
good faith in making individual selections.' . . . The prosecutor
therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the
particular case to be tried."

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98

(1986) (citation omitted); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah
1989) (quoting State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App. 1987)
("an explanation given by a prosecutor for the exercise of a
peremptory challenge must be . . . 'related to the case being
tried, . . . , n ) ) ; Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga. 1987);
Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988); State v.
Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1988); Floyd v. State, 539 So.2d 357,
362 (Ala. App. 1987).
As alluded to above, a female, black juror's alleged
whininess is in no way relevant to a specific bias or to his or her
ability to follow the law.

Even if the characteristic befitted

Ms. English's disposition, the State's purported and unrelated
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justification fails.

See, e.g., Butler, 731 S.W.2d at 272; Gamble,

357 S.E.2d at 796 ("The prosecutor's explanation that [the
prospective juror] is a Mason is unpersuasive [as] [i]t is not clear
how Masonic membership is related to this case"); Hill v. State, 787
S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App. 1990) (reversal required when, in addition
to striking a prospective juror because of his race, the
prosecutor's explanations were based on assumptions and reasons
unrelated to the case such as "I just didn't like the way he
responded to my questions, his attitude, his demeanor").
E.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE
PROSECUTION'S REBUTTAL EXPLANATION

Indirect discrimination4 is no more tolerable than blatant
racism.

Compare State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1989)

4

The subtle forms of improperly exercised peremptory
challenges have also been recognized:
Nor is outright pervarication . . . the only danger
here. "[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives
are legal." . . . A prosecutor's own conscious or
unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an
explanation as well supported. . . . [Prosecutors'
peremptories are based on their "seat-of-the-pants
instincts." . . . Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may
often be just another term for racial prejudice. Even if
all parties approach the Court's mandate with the best of
conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to
confront and overcome their own racism on all levels. . .
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), reprinted in State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22-23 (Fla.
1988).
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(emphasis added) ("we hold that race was an indirect but significant
reason for the peremptory challenge and vacate defendant's
conviction"), with Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.

, 120 L.Ed.2d

33, 44, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992) (the Constitution prohibits purposeful
discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory
challenges).

While the prosecutor's actions did not appear to be

ill-willed, his stated justifications nonetheless failed to meet the
necessary legal standards.
The trial court must not "discharge its duty to inquire
into and carefully evaluate the explanations offered by the
prosecutor[.]"

People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 112 (Cal. 1986);

Floyd, 539 So.2d at 362 ("intuitive judgment or suspicion by the
prosecutor [is not enough and there is a] . . . danger [in] taking
the explanations at face value rather than scrutinizing them
carefully"); Williams, 548 So.2d at 504 ("When evaluating the
reasons, the trial court had a duty to reject any explanation that
did not meet these [the above] requirements").
The court here may have agreed with the prosecutors
assessment of Ms. English, but an apparently facially neutral
explanation must still meet the necessary legal requirements.

In

light of the circumstances discussed above, her allegedly "whiny"
demeanor failed to clearly and specifically state a legitimate
race-neutral justification.
F.

THE HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS INAPPLICABLE
TO THE CASE AT BAR

The fifth consideration announced in the Harrison decision,
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a harmless error analysis, is not actually supported by the cited
authority.

The Harrison opinion read in relevant part:

if we had found clear error, Harrison,s conviction
could be affirmed only by showing that the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17
L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (quoted in Cantu I, 750 P.2d
at 597.) This is a difficult showing to make, and
prosecutors who are questioned in the future about
possibly improper peremptory juror challenges would do
well to consider this in formulating their responses,
making sure that they meet the Batson requirements.
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote
omitted).
The unprecedented proposed language from Cantu I was
supported only by a single justice in a plurality opinion.

See

Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597 (Howe, J.). While the other members of the
court were able to agree that the case should be remanded, in a
fragmented set of opinions the court could not agree on what should
occur upon remand.

See id. at 597-98. Moreover, in the subsequent

Cantu II opinion, no harmless error analysis was followed or even
mentioned.

See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 519.

Instead, the Utah

Supreme Court explained:
the fact that the juror was Hispanic was the ultimate
predicate for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge.
This reason for exclusion of the juror is neither
neutral nor legitimate. Therefore, we hold that race
was an indirect but significant reason for the
peremptory challenge and vacate defendant's
conviction. The matter is remanded for a new trial.
778 P.2d at 519.
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The analysis there is consistent with the holding of Batson
and its progeny.

See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100

(1986) (emphasis added) (if "the prosecutor does not come forward
with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require
that petitioner's conviction be reversed"); Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d
at 426 (no harmless error analysis is required because "we find that
a criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the prosecutor
excludes jurors at his or her own trial on account of race" and
because "[a] prosecutor's wrongful exclusion of a juror by a
race-based peremptory challenge is a constitutional violation
committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings"); cf.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.

, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 321, 111 S.Ct.

1246 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (no
harmless error analysis for "structural errors" such as the
"unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the
grand jury that indicted him, despite overwhelming evidence of his
guilt")); People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 112-113 (Cal 1986)
(Vasquez's reasoning is even more applicable, of course, to the
systematic exclusion of Blacks from the jury that actually tried and
convicted the defendant in the case at bar"); Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d
at 428 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 107 L.Ed.2d 905,
110 S.Ct. 803 (1990) ("race-based exclusion is no more permissible
at the individual petit jury stage than at the venire stage")).
As the above authority indicates, the harm extends beyond
its effect on the defendant.

"The purpose of the jury system is to

impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole
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that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance
with the law by persons who are fair.

The verdict will not be

accepted or understood . . . if the jury is chosen by unlawful means
at the outset."

Powers, 113 L.Ed.2d at 426 (emphasis added); see

also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (1980) (emphasis added)
("The State claims that the defendant has not proved he was
prejudiced when he used his peremptory challenges to remove the
challenged jurors.

However, defendant cannot prove this

empirically, and he is not required to do so").
Viewed another way, appellate courts have repeatedly
refused to assume the fact finding role of the jury because a
reading of the "cold record" cannot substitute for the jury's first
hand observation of the witnesses and the events perceived in the
"heat of trial."

See, e.g., State v. Underwood, 737 P.2d 995, 996

(Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted) ("In reviewing a
defendant's conviction, we do not substitute our judgment for that
of the jury.

It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses").

For

reasons unknown, a single individual who was excluded as a
prospective juror could have affected the entire decision making
process.

Cf. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (construing Crawford v.

Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975) (in "a civil case where six
of eight jurors could return a verdict, a similar error was held not
harmless although there was a unanimous verdict, because the juror
who remained when the appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges
'may have been a hawk amid seven doves and imposed his will upon
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them'")); Utah Const, art. I, § 10 ("In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous"); see also State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064
(Utah 1989) ("This Court has repeatedly held that it is prejudicial
error to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove
a prospective juror who should properly have been removed for
cause").
A harmless error analysis is improper because an appellate
court cannot truly recreate and retroactively perceive the
circumstances pertinent to an individual's (or the collective
jury's) deliberations.

Questions of guilt or innocence are properly

left for a trial by jury.

Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added)

("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to . . .
trial by an impartial jury . . . " ) ; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 ("In a
jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury").
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties^
hibited acts A — Penalties: ,
l&iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
% sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled subst*m«*« when thev are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
53£Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:

(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony,

A M E N D M E N T XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof^ are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

FebeZLKL*

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 609

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convirted^ancj^e court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidenc^btitweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment

PART 2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-

PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.

77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of feet by the jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors, In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.

Sec. 12. [Eights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

